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ABSTRACT 
South Africa’s sugar industry has long been distinguished by its large number of small-scale sugarcane 
growers (SSGs) farming on ‘communal’ land and its peculiar, privately administered regulatory structure. In 
recent years, however, the number of small-scale growers has declined precipitously from a peak of around 
50 000 in the early 2000s to fewer than 14 000 in 2011, a trend attributed by many to the impacts of 
drought. Over the same period, South Africa’s sugar milling companies have been investing heavily in 
countries to the north, heralding substantial shifts in patterns of national and corporate production. As 
Brazilian sugar imports begin to penetrate the domestic market, the industry’s organizing regulatory 
framework is also set to change, after more than 10 years of confidential negotiation. A re-appraisal of the 
structure of the industry, and in particular of the role of SSGs within it, is thus overdue. 
 
This paper argues that the relationship between the rise and fall of small scale sugarcane production and 
the industry’s governing regulatory structure is closer than usually appreciated. Critically, the emergence of 
SSG production in the late 1970s to the early 1980s can be traced to industry-subsidised initiatives, 
disguised as micro-credit, which brought commercially inalienable Bantustan land into cane production 
under strong miller oversight. From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, however, the elimination of these 
subsidies encouraged millers to withdraw from direct oversight and to subcontract farmer support, while 
simultaneously instigating an increase in SSG numbers by removing restrictions on grower registration. 
Enduring drought must certainly be understood as an important proximal factor in the rapid decline of 
SSGs in the 2000s, but their rapid increase in the first place was structurally fragile. In particular, these 
processes reflected SSGs shifting structural relationships to South African sugar milling and planting capital. 
Understanding these changes thus requires locating them within a longer-term historical drama 
characterised by crisis and competition, and driven by key contradictions of South African capitalism 
during and after ‘late’ apartheid. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As a consequence of South Africa’s long history of racialised dispossession, the post-apartheid 
ANC government inherited a commercial agricultural sector defined by high levels of 
concentration and capital intensity, and of course, its (predominantly white) racial character. 
While policies to liberalise and de-regulate the sector from the 1980s onwards had, by the late 
1990s, effectively removed most of the direct systems of subsidy and support received by white 
commercial agriculture, since then the rigours of global competition have resulted in the 
emergence of agro-food complexes of an increasingly integrated and industrial character 
(Bernstein 2013). Meanwhile, government has been frustrated in its attempts to incorporate 
black farmers into this emergent agrarian structure — over which it has less and less control — 
and attracted widespread criticism for the ‘failure’ of its land reform programme (Hall 2010).  
 
The South African sugar industry, however, has appeared to stand apart from these trends. 
Although sharing the concentrated and capital-intensive character of much of South Africa’s 
other agro-industries, the sugar industry has long been distinguished by its peculiar regulatory 
structure, and ongoing tariff protection from a world market in which many countries subsidise 
their producers. In terms of its social character, the industry has been marked by its unusual 
claim to large numbers of black, small-scale sugarcane outgrowers (SSGs), farming 
predominately under customary tenure in the former Bantustans (now termed communal 
areas), a feature largely attributed to the industry’s extension of small-scale credit from the 
1970s. Yet both of these distinguishing features are now in considerable flux.  
 
In recent years ‘South African’ sugar capital has pursued an aggressive strategy of expansion 
and investment in enterprises located in South Africa’s northern neighbours and, as cheap 
Brazilian sugar imports begin to penetrate the domestic market, the industry’s regulatory 
structure is set for far-reaching reform by 2015, after more than ten years of confidential 
negotiations. Meanwhile, the number of registered small-scale sugarcane growers has declined 
precipitously amidst a long-term drought, from a peak of around 50 000 in the early 2000s to 
approximately 25 200 in 2012, of which only less than 13 044 actually submitted cane (SASA 
2012: 17).  Citing widespread fraud, default and the writing off of millions of rands in 
unrecovered loans, the industry has closed down its much-lauded credit scheme, and shifted the 
emphasis of its support to large- and medium-scale black sugarcane growers and the proactive 
facilitation of land reform. Yet while the happenstance of drought and the idiosyncrasies of 
small-scale production present significant constraints to small growers, neither condition is 
particularly novel, and do not account for their generalised decline. Questions of why the 
industry was compelled to terminate its credit facility when it did, and why small-grower 
production is so negatively affected by drought, requires a critical examination of the 
conventional narrative of the small growers’ growth and decline. 
 
In this paper I contend that the connection between the fortunes of small-scale sugarcane 
growers and the industry’s organising regulatory structure is more intimate than is commonly 
supposed.  Rather than ‘small-but-independent’ farmers nurtured by credit, a narrative which 
implicitly centres the growth of small-scale production on the ‘correction’ of a market 
‘distortion’, I argue that the rise and fall of small-scale sugarcane production is closely tied to 
growers’ shifting terms of incorporation into the broader industry, as mediated by different 
iterations of the regulatory structure. In particular, these changes conditioned a shifting 
structural relationship to fractions of South African sugar milling and planting capital. 
Understanding these changes hence requires locating them within a longer-term historical 
drama, one of crisis and competition reflecting key contradictions of South African capitalism 
during and after ‘late’ apartheid. 
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2. FROM FAHEY TO VAN BILJON: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 
NATIONAL-CORPORATIST SOUTH AFRICAN SUGAR REGIME 
The initiation of South African sugar production in late-19th century Natal was somewhat 
peculiar insofar as conventional patterns of colonial trade with the European metropole were 
being disrupted by the end of the slave trade and rapid growth of the production of sugar beet 
in Europe. Nonetheless, early experiments in plantation production took hold during a brief 
period of reasonably high world market prices, and were quickly consolidated by the Natal 
government erecting import duties and importing over 150 000 indentured Indian labourers 
between 1860 and 1911 (Richardson 1982: 518–20; Halpern 2004: 26; Richardson 2009: 50–4; 
Friedmann & McMichael: 100).   
 
As in Europe’s tropical colonies, at first glance the plantation form’s combination of sugarcane 
cultivation and sugar milling-processing appears as a necessary adaptation to the particular 
technical requirements of sugar production. This is due not least of all to the peculiar labour 
cycle imposed by the crop’s requirement for immediate processing, thus defined by long 
growing periods punctuated by harried harvests. As observed by Sidney Mintz (1986) in his 
seminal book Sweetness and Power, early sugar plantations embodied something of an 
intrinsically industrial-capitalist logic: 
The combination of field and factory, of skilled workers with unskilled, 
and the strictness of scheduling together gave an industrial cast to 
plantation enterprises, even though the use of coercion to extract labor 
might have seemed somewhat unfamiliar to latter-day capitalists.  
 Mintz, 1986: 51–2  
 
Nonetheless, as Richardson (1982) convincingly argues, the emergence of Natal’s sugar 
plantations were not an inevitability, but were rather primarily conditioned by the relative 
concentration of landed property, driving high prices for land held largely for rental or 
speculative purposes (Richardson 1982: 520; Atmore 1985: 89). The social basis of the 
plantation system would be further reinforced up until the dawn of the twentieth century. As 
limits to expansion in the domestic market failed to compensate for low world sugar prices, 
many of Natal’s plantations consolidated and took an increasingly corporate character as 
struggling individual planters were forced into the hands of merchant banks (Richardson 1982: 
522–6; Graves & Richardson 1980: 226). 
 
The opening of Zululand to sugar production, following its conquest and annexation in 1904, 
would provide a boon to sugar capital, but in a new social form which would fundamentally 
alter sugar production in South Africa. Most foundationally, while remaining technically 
integrated within vertical supply relationships, the expansion heralded the social division of 
sugar capital into two fractions: centralised sugar processing (‘millers’), on the one hand, and 
sugarcane cultivation (‘planters’), on the other. With the explicit objective of establishing a class 
of independent white commercial farmers, government surveyors allocated plots for the 
purposes of supplying new, centralised mills and processing facilities established by 
consolidated companies. In addition to enjoying the promise of a guaranteed supply base and 
government-fixed sugar prices, the mills were further erected largely on the basis of 
government-guaranteed loans (Minaar 1992: 19–20; Richardson 1982: 527; Lincoln 1995: 52).   
 
In this initial phase, the Zululand expansion represented something of a ‘triple-win’ for milling 
capital, beneficiary settler-planters and the Natal and then Union government. But the emerging 
social division of sugar capitals created new contradictions, giving rise to struggles that would 
come to define the character of the industry. Perhaps even more fundamental was the more 
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pronounced, socially-defined division of the labour force, between skilled, largely white mill 
labour (much of which was sourced from Mauritius) and black field labour. Having missed the 
opportunity to exploit a servile, indentured Indian workforce, the Zululand planters were 
compelled to rely almost exclusively on African labour from the neighbouring reserves, the 
sourcing and disciplining of whom was a continual and preoccupying struggle. Most 
problematic was the fact that sugarcane farm wages remained endemically below those offered 
on the mines. While the prospects of above-ground work in the cane fields offered some 
enticement to men unwilling to work in underground mines, planters often experienced 
widespread desertion of labourers and competitive under-cutting of the wages they offered, 
particularly during peak harvest periods, and hence came to rely on offering advance wages. 
The ‘problem’ of African labour indeed became one of the central issues around which incipient 
planters’ unions organised, coming into frequent conflict with the Department of Native Affairs 
and Department of Health. Although both departments refused to acquiesce to planter 
proposals to demarcate portions of the reserves exclusively for sugarcane production, and 
sought to shut down border ‘trading stores’ established to source Mozambican labour, planters’ 
lobbies similarly acted to frustrate government’s attempts to raise the living standards of black 
field labour (Beinart 1990: 6; BTI 1927: 4; Minaar 1992: 92, 96; Lincoln 1980: 43). 
 
While unwilling to grant planters extraordinary powers over African labour at the expense of 
mining capital, government was more willing to ensure planters’ commercial survival with 
interventions against the interests of milling capital.  Government’s influence over the industry’s 
absolute surplus had always been strong owing to its powers to fix sugar prices and impose 
duties on sugar imports, but from the 1920s onwards the Board of Trade and Industry (BTI), 
under the chairmanship of first AJ Bruwer and then FJ Fahey, sought to manage the relative 
distribution of the industry’s surplus between planter and miller sections (i.e. fractions of 
capital) by exerting control over the terms of exchange between them. A formula known as the 
cost-based Division of Proceeds (DoP) was implemented as the industry’s central allocative 
mechanism, dividing total industry proceeds (in the domestic and export market) according to 
the average costs claimed by each section. Divided by measures of output, this would form the 
basis of cane and sugar prices. Although the DoP’s premise on the division on average costs 
ensured a consistent incentive to improve productivity, special redistributive measures were 
also instituted to augment the earnings of small planters, while refiners (owned by milling 
capital) were granted a ‘first charge’ claim on total proceeds (and hence could make riskless 
investment). Vertical control over the sugar surplus further enabled government to ensure 
special rebate concessions to manufactures, industry absorption of freight charges, and an 
obligation to produce a cheap variety of ‘grade 2’ sugar (BTI 1931: 25; BTI 1947: 10, 30, 32–4) 1. 
 
Critically, however, the careful management of the vertical distribution of surplus was 
dependant on extending horizontal control over production.  A persistent concern was the 
industry’s dependence on a volatile world-market. Although import duties protected the 
domestic market from international competition, the industry was periodically lured into 
expanded production for export to take advantage of brief increases in world prices, typically 
followed by sharp price drops and declining sugar values for the industry as a whole. Two key 
measures were imposed to combat such recurrent crises of ‘over-production’. The first was 
establishing a principle of pro-rata export, whereby each miller would contribute output to 
export commitments proportional to their share of national production, effectively dampening 
competition for domestic market share. Secondly, a system of quotas was instituted to exert 
                                                             
1 Although summarised for brevity here, the actual sequence of events leading to government establishing and later 
modifying the DoP reveals the particular tensions between fractions of capital that underlay the centralised milling model. 
Initially, planters had been subsumed under Miller-Planter-Agreements (MPAs) carrying strictures of supply and pricing which 
heavily favoured millers. While millers had generally successfully resisted altering the terms of exchange, a concession 
allowing planters to share in export profits backfired when international prices dropped in the post WWI period. Planters 
successfully resisted sharing in export losses, and there was a breakdown of co-operation amongst millers. It was millers’ 
desperation for higher import duties that first compelled them to negotiate with planters and a government broadly 
sympathetic to planter interests (BTI 1947:11–12; BTI 1927: 6). 
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quantitative control over total production, premised on estimates of domestic consumption and 
international export commitments governed by South Africa’s obligations to the International 
Sugar Agreement (BTI 1947: 32–4, 44)2. 
 
The emergent national-corporatist regime was ultimately crystallised in the ratification of the 
1936 Sugar Act that granted the re-constituted South African Sugar Association (SASA) 
statutory powers of self-regulation, and promised a new era of ‘order’ and ‘rationality’. Most 
optimistically, it sought to promote productive efficiency, while ‘resolving’ the tensions between 
millers and planters, and simultaneously restraining the impulse to over-production and hence 
export-dependence. Moreover, although by dampening direct competition for market share the 
new regulatory edifice encouraged a tendency towards greater concentration in ownership, 
government was openly ambivalent so long as sugar prices were fixed by legislation and the 
distribution of total proceeds was carefully managed through strictly delineated terms of 
exchange.  Extraordinary domestic growth during the post-WWII era appeared to vindicate this 
optimism. Productivity-enhancing agronomic methods and new varietal strains, together with 
innovations in loading, handling, and indeed milling techniques, kept pace with rapid growth in 
domestic sales. Moreover, despite persistent complaints from white planters, African labourers 
remained sufficiently disciplined to constrain widespread uptake of mechanical harvesting 
technologies (BTI 1947: 120–8; Van Biljon 1970: 7, 70). 
 
However, by the early 1960s the promise of high export prices once again lured the industry 
into a phase of purposeful expansion, with the particular goal of attaining a high world quota 
during the re-negotiation of the International Sugar Agreement (ISA). The expansion was 
further preceded by a bitter war amongst different milling companies over ownership and 
control of the industry, culminating in a hostile takeover of Huletts, and concentrating the 
industry’s ownership structure in a complex web of cross-cutting share-holdings, at the centre 
of which was the company CG Smith (Van Biljon 1970: 12; Lincoln 1980: 40). But the expansion 
did not pay off. Despite South Africa obtaining the desired quota, local production rose far 
beyond what was originally envisioned and a subsequent decline in world prices left milling 
capital (in which Afrikaners now had a stake in the form of  the Traansvaalse Suikerkorporasie 
Beperk (TSB)) highly indebted (Nedbank 1976: 103, 133–5). Despite the fact that preventing 
export dependence had been an explicit purpose of the quantitative controls on production 
instituted in the 1930s, the industry once again found itself in a chronic state of over-
production, from which it would not fully recover for over 30 years.  
 
Government consequently stepped in to mediate yet again, extending a guaranteed loan to the 
industry and launching another Commission of Inquiry in an attempt to find structural solutions 
to the unfolding crisis. But the recommendations of the new Van Biljon Commission of Inquiry 
marked a fundamental shift in emphasis. Under Fahey, the BTI had focused on managing the 
vertical distribution of surplus, and controlling the overall or ‘absolute’ surplus rested largely on 
measures to restrict output within the confines of the relatively high-priced domestic market. 
Yet despite the fact that the crisis had largely been engendered in the first place by a purposeful 
expansion in production, the Commission’s recommendations eschewed measures to restrain 
output in favour of promoting sustained competitive engagement with the world market. Its 
recommendations centred on maximising productive efficiency by ‘rationalising’ the industry’s 
high-cost structure and promoting greater capitalisation. Some of the more notable 
recommendations included a phasing out of all subsidies to smaller producers as well as the 
complex system of miller transport subsidies to planters, the institution of a price-stabilisation 
fund (PSF) to ride-out ‘lean’ export years with surpluses garnered in ‘fat’ years, and a new tier 
                                                             
2 As with the DoP, the institution of quantitative controls over production was heavily influenced by government’s concern 
for the welfare of planters. Of particular concern was the rapid drop-out of planters after their agreement to share in export 
losses over the course of the Great Depression. Until quantitative controls were instituted, government considered millers to 
be acting with ‘equanimity’ in response to the drop out, opting to simply extend their own estate production rather than act 
in concert to reduce national production (BTI 1947: 32–4).  
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added to the DoP which accounted for a ‘Return on Capital’.  Furthermore, government’s 
abolition of ‘re-sale price maintenance’ in 1969 empowered retailers to sidestep wholesalers by 
purchasing directly from the industry’s sales distributors and further engage in price 
competition, largely through new ‘pre-packed’ sugar, effectively extending industry integration 
with retailers and cheapening sugar at no detriment to milling capital (Van Biljon 1970: 15–17, 
33, 49, 62, 64, 67). 
 
3. SMALL -SCALE GROWERS EX MACHINA: THE EMERGENCE OF 
SMALL-SCALE PRODUCTION IN THE ERA OF RATIONALISATION 
The full scope of ‘rationalisation’ would however be delayed by windfall earnings garnered in 
the early 1970s when record export prices were recorded3. These peak prices briefly re-
awakened hopes for further industry expansion, and with government’s debt fully amortised, 
simultaneously provided a basis for delaying its recommendations, particularly in relation to 
transport costs. At the same time, however, the apartheid government’s policy of ‘homeland’ 
consolidation meant that some 17 000 ha of cane-growing land were about to be acquired for 
incorporation into the Bantustans. It was in this context, and hence no coincidence that the 
industry first initiated experiments to substantially extend cane production into the Bantustans 
themselves. 
 
The centre-piece of the proposed expansion was the Financial Aid Fund (FAF), a small-scale 
grower credit scheme established with R5 million from the industry’s record export earnings 
(SASYB 1972/3: 21). The underlying logic of the programme was fairly straightforward: owing 
to a lack of infrastructure, agricultural equipment and education, KwaZulu farmers were seen as 
largely ‘subsistence oriented’. Moreover, owing to the prevailing system of customary tenure, 
potential farmers were unable to use their land as collateral for loans for purchasing inputs or 
equipment. FAF would allow a potential grower’s crop to be used as collateral, and thus create a 
revolving small-scale credit fund offering low interest rates over a ten-year period.  In addition 
to small-scale growers benefitting from the stewardship of experienced white planters and 
millers, industry constructed three training centres (costing R600 000) to help transfer 
knowledge of the latest scientific cane-farming practices (SASYB, 1984/5: 157; SASYB 1981/2: 
48). 
 
Certainly, initiatives to ‘develop’ small black farmers by drawing them into commercial 
sugarcane production were not an entirely new phenomenon.  As observed by Vaughan 
(1992a), the idea of bringing black farmers into commercial production had been pervasive in 
earlier state planning documents such as the 1955 Tomlinson Commission, and asides on this 
issue can be found in Board of Trade and Industries (BTI) documents from the 1930s (Vaughan 
1992a: 2; BTI 1931: 16). By the 1950s, the Native Affairs Department (NAD) had established a 
limited assistance programme for small-scale sugarcane producers, providing finance for 
fertilizer, seedcane and ploughing. As a result of such assistance, a total of 1 060 new SSGs 
began sugarcane cultivation on 4 409 ha, increasing the total area under small grower 
production to 7 616 ha by 1956 (Bates & Sokhela 2003: 107). Underlying such initiatives was 
the ideal of nurturing commercially independent, black ‘yeoman’ farmers, as articulated by one 
NAD official: 
                                                             
3 The increase is generally attributed to an unusually large amount of sugar imported by the Soviet Union and European 
Community after experiencing particularly poor crop years. The ISA responded by ordering signature countries to reduce 
their mandatory stocks, but the measure failed to abate the increasing price and quotas were effectively suspended. 
Augmented by speculation, prices boomed to an unprecedented peak: whereas in 1967 prices had stood at R32 per ton, by 
1974 they had hit R243 per ton. (BTI, 1976, p. 7) The industry windfall in 1972 and 1973 amounted to R100 million and R190 
million (versus an average of R30 million per annum from 1967–70) (BTI 1976: 7), enabling the industry to fully amortise the 
balance of its R16 million its debt to government, allow a 0.5c per kg price decrease, and pay R19.6 million into the price 
stabilisation fund, which reached R94.5 million by 1975 (BTI 1976: 9). 
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Our whole aim is to make the Bantu [sic] self-sufficient, but experience has 
shown that this is not achieved by giving everything for nothing. At the 
same time we appreciate that the Bantu [sic] lacks capital. For that reason 
we will help in the initial stages of the scheme. We hope eventually that the 
tribal authorities for the area will take over complete management.  
 Cited in Vaughan 1992a: 3  
 
In principle, the vision informing the FAF was not radically different.  From its inception the 
Fund considered itself as ‘not simply a provider of monetary aid [but a] development agency’ 
and favoured a policy to pursue the “establishment of fulltime farmers on viable land units’’ 
(SASYB 1974/5: 50). Much to the frustration of the Fund, however, both of these conditions 
would prove difficult to achieve. One obstacle was the prevailing patterns of land distribution in 
KwaZulu, which were found to be ‘fragmented’ in ‘uneconomic’ sizes. Furthermore, with 
Bantustan economies characterised by high levels of migrant labour, the Fund’s early policy of 
seeking ‘full-time’ farmers and not extending support to those seeking to augment off-farm 
income was similarly problematic, and exacerbated by a general shortage of labour and 
insufficient interest in agriculture, particularly by young men (SASYB 1975/6: 50). 
 
Moreover, the expansionary conditions which had provided the main impetus for promoting 
small-scale production receded as quickly as they had advanced. As high world prices regressed 
to their chronic pre-peak lows, the 1970s gave way to renewed struggles, both between 
government and the industry as a whole and between miller and planter fractions of capital. In 
relation to the former, as funds from the PSF were rapidly depleted and industrial costs 
surpassed export earnings, the industry urged a reluctant government to raise domestic sugar 
prices. While government resisted, millers and planters also struggled with each other over the 
distribution of the industry’s standing surplus in increasingly arcane battles over the definitions 
of ‘depreciation’ and ‘return on capital’ employed in the Division of Proceeds (BTI 1976: 18–26).  
 
In spite of these constraints, the figures paint a compelling picture of FAF’s apparent success.  In 
1972, the year before FAF’s inception, 3 455 small-scale growers delivered 376 986 tons of 
cane; seven years later, in 1979, those figures had more than doubled, with 8 070 growers 
submitting 873 023 tons from an area of around 38 000 ha (Rorich 1982: 8). Moreover, FAF 
continued to expand and attract more resources in the face of the recessionary and inflationary 
conditions of the 1970s. Indeed, the liquidity of FAF had come under growing pressure, as 
annual lending exceeded R1 million as a result of rapidly inflating development costs. Though 
initial per hectare development costs were anticipated to stand at around R200 per hectare for 
the initial 5 000 ha, by 1977 per hectare costs had risen to R630, and by 1981 over R13 million 
had been extended to SSGs for 13 338 ha of new development and 6 527 ha of ratoon 
management. Despite these pressure, the Fund’s overall capacity was nonetheless raised to 
R10 million, and was further granted another R1 million from the industry’s development fund, 
a concessionary R500 000 from Barclays at 3% interest, and began turning to financial markets 
to augment its reserves (SASYB 1974/5: 49; SASYB 1975/6: 49; SASYB 1978/9: 49; SASYB 
1980/1). 
 
Understanding why FAF and small-scale sugarcane production not only persisted but expanded 
throughout the 1970s, however, requires closer examination of the political and economic 
terms of small-grower incorporation into the sugar industry. A key feature of the initial 
expansion was the way in which  FAF’s developmental mission articulated with South African 
‘homeland’ policies and with the KwaZulu Bantustan government’s ‘development’ structures. 
From the outset, one severe problem was the weakness of prevailing infrastructure, particularly 
in regards to roads and local cane depots (or ‘zones’), compelling FAF to seek ‘cooperative 
 
Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies: Working Paper Series     9 December 2013 
7 Working paper 28  
action’ with the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC) (SASYB 1974/5:. 50), which had been 
involved in funding sugar initiatives for several years. The BIC was replaced by the Corporation 
for Economic Development (CED) in 1977, but following the recommendations of the 1978 
McCrystal Report, it too was replaced by individual Bantustan development agencies (in this 
case, the KwaZulu Development Corporation), and six years later, the KwaZulu Finance 
Corporation (KFC).  
 
The CED had always supported the establishment of miller-owned ‘development companies’ to 
facilitate a ‘tripartite alliance’ between the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture, millers and 
small-scale black farmers. In 1976, the first of such companies, Sukumani, was established by 
Tongaat, and provided with soft loans from the CED (and later, the KFC) for on-lending to small-
growers, contractors and for capital works such as the building of loading zones (Rahman 
1997: 8). In 1980 C.G Smith’s development company, Inkanyezi, was founded and by 1982 it 
employed 64 extension officers in addition to the KwaZulu government’s own 60-plus (SASYB 
1984/5: 157; SASYB 1981/2: 48). Furthermore, when a crippling drought occurred in the early 
1980s, relief emanating from the KwaZulu government was further channelled through the 
Fund (SASYB 1980/1: 49). The precise extent of KwaZulu government assistance, particularly 
relative to that provided by FAF, has not been quantified (SASYB 1984/5). In 1982, however, the 
chairman of SASA commented in public on its significance: 
With regard to the backing that the Fund receives, I must pay tribute to the 
tremendous role played by the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and 
Forestry, which together with millers and growers have provided all the 
infrastructure and extension services necessary for the development of 
sugarcane lands in KwaZulu. It is estimated that the infrastructure 
provided by KwaZulu has to date matched in value the loans advanced by 
the Fund. 
(emphasis added) SASYB, 1981/2, p. 39   
 
These strong institutional links between the KwaZulu government and miller ‘development’ 
companies such as Sukumani and Inkanyezi, are only part of the picture. Of crucial importance 
was the position of the development companies within the regulatory structure of the industry 
as a whole. In particular, as miller subsidiaries, development companies were incorporated 
within the division of proceeds as ‘millers’ costs, thus increasing millers’ claims on total 
industry proceeds. As observed by Rahman (1997), development companies therefore enjoyed 
three bonuses: 
The first involved political and financial backing by state agencies, the 
second concerned the operation of the FAF credit system which came tied 
with their services; the third is the attribution of their overheads and 
variable costs as milling costs by their miller parents. As milling costs, 
though they are in reality sugar growing costs, they went towards the cost 
based division of proceeds! These development companies not only did 
profitable business with smallholders, they recouped their overheads and 
variable costs in the division of proceeds.  
(Emphasis added), Rahman, 1997, p. 23   
 
Critically then, the supply of small-scale sugarcane was firstly cheapened through the effective 
subsidy of the KwaZulu government, and secondly augmented millers’ relative claims on the 
total industry surplus through the division of proceeds, i.e. at the expense of planter capital. This 
augmented claim was accentuated with the introduction in 1990 of the ‘two-pools’ system of 
cane pricing. Within this system, returns to growers and millers would hence be subdivided into 
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an ‘A-pool’ representing the higher-priced domestic quota and a surplus ‘B-pool’ production 
which would fetch lower world market prices. Small-scale grower production, however, would 
always receive ‘A-pool’ prices.  Thus by increasing the small-scale cane proportion of their 
supply base, millers would simultaneously further increase their share of returns from the 
domestic market. As such, small-scale grower production acted as something of an extension of 
millers’ own-estate production. While born of a short-lived impulse by the industry to expand 
levels of production, small-scale growing was maintained, under conditions of contraction, as a 
strategy that served the interests of a particular fraction of sugar capital — the milling 
companies.  
 
The 1980s saw an intensification of world market dependence and continued exposure to the 
pressures induced by global ‘over-production’. While the strain of export-dependence had been 
briefly offset by the spike in world prices in the early 1970s, two severe droughts in 1980/81 
and 1983/84 prevented the industry from realising the benefits of a second dramatic peak in 
export prices. In addition to missing this second potential export windfall, by 1985 the ISA had 
completely collapsed, taking with it the advantage of South Africa’s exceptionally large quota. 
Exports were also beginning to be constrained by gradually advancing international sanctions 
against apartheid South Africa (Lewis 1990: 3). As industrial costs stubbornly exceeded total 
proceeds with an increasing proportion of production accounted for by a constrained and low-
priced world-market, and with an increasingly debt-burdened industry calling for domestic 
price increases, government launched yet another investigation into the structure of the 
industry in 1982  (SASYB 1982/3: 194; SASYB 1983/4: 44).  
 
Starting where the Van Biljon Commission had left off, the Rorich Commission argued for 
greater ‘flexibility’ through ‘rationalisation’. Its most far-reaching recommendation was the 
complete removal of all the transport subsidies hitherto provided to planters by millers. Yet the 
Commission’s reasoning that planters would thus be ‘incentivised’ to switch to more economical 
means of transportation, and that the removal of the subsidies would encourage the exit of 
white planters located at ‘uneconomic’ distances from mills, was accompanied by a 
recommendation to issue new quotas to plant 65 683 ha with cane and produce an estimated 
additional 335 000 tons of sugar per year. Two-thirds of this expansion would come from small-
scale black growers in the Bantustans, with 33 200 ha in KwaZulu, and further 1 000 ha, 
6 000 ha, and 4 000 ha from Mangete, KaNgwane and the Transkei respectively (Rorich 
1982: 14). In their original depositions to the Commission, SASA had been reticent about any 
the potential for ‘horizontal’ expansion to new cane areas, arguing that ‘vertical’ improvements 
in productivity would allow projected growth in demand to be met. Anticipating the exit of 
‘uneconomic’ white farmers, however, less capital-intensive black growers were seen as helping 
to meet this demand. Indeed, miller plans to construct newer and ever more consolidated 
processing facilities, which would need large quantities of throughput to be economic, were 
anticipated to include provision for expanding small-grower supply bases4. 
 
There was also a national-political dimension to the decision to provide more quotas to small-
scale growers. Representations made by the KwaZulu government stressed the positive 
‘developmental impact’ afforded by increases in small-scale cane production (as evident in 
higher numbers of black farmers registered, a larger area under cane, etc.). But perhaps an even 
more cogent argument was the potentially legitimising role of small-scale sugarcane production. 
                                                             
4 Perhaps most notable was Tongaat-Hulett’s endeavour to consolidate its Empangeni and Felixton mills into ‘Felixton II’, 
which at a cost of R150 million would boast an output capacity greater than the previous mills combined, and CG Smith’s 
similar effort to raise the capacity of its Sezela, Illovo and Noodsburg mills (SASYB 1980/1: 19). While these expansions were 
anticipated to yield economies of scale, both the short-term increase in capital expenditure and the boost in output they 
pre-supposed accentuated the squeeze between high production costs and low export returns. To the extent that small-
growers acted as an effective extension of millers’ own-estate production, they could act as a ‘wedge’ against planting 
capital, in a class strategy analogous to that pursued by milling capital in the 1930s, when millers expanded their own cane 
production while less-capitalised planters dropped out of the industry as a result of the heavier burden they carried of low 
international prices under stringent terms of exchange. 
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KwaZulu government representatives argued that a failure to expand small-scale production 
would ‘cause scepticism among the KwaZulu people regarding statements by leaders of the 
sugar industry that it is in the interests of the country to ensure positive economic development 
for Black people’ (Rorich 1982: 10).  Indeed, in the wider context of South Africa’s involvement 
in the Mozambican civil war, the link between local economic stability, political legitimacy and 
national security was also made explicit: in the case of expanding an irrigation project at 
KaNgwane and local cane production by white farmers near the TSB mill, government 
emphasised the ‘gravity of the potential danger to South Africa if border regions should become 
depopulated’ (Rorich 1982: 12). 
 
Independent studies of small-scale sugarcane farming in the 1980s, however, threw doubt on 
the notion that an independent class of sugarcane farmers was emerging, as implied in the 
industry’s claim that it was promoting ‘development’.  One of the earliest and most cited studies 
was Cobbett’s investigation of sugarcane farming in two communities located about 100km 
from Pietermaritzburg: Nqunquma, where farmers had supplied the Noodsberg mill since the 
1960s, and Newspaper, where farmers had supplied the Glendale mill since the 1970s. 
Producing on small and unequally distributed land-holdings, only about 14% of homesteads at 
Newspaper with more than 4 ha under sugarcane were able to meet their basic subsistence 
requirements from sugarcane earnings, and none such homesteads did so at Nqunquma 
(Cobbett 1984: 11). With cane growing resulting in the displacement of both food cropping and 
cattle grazing, both communities had become dependent on a mixture of cash-income from 
sugarcane and migrant labour earnings, a pattern confirmed by Vaughan in the Glendale, Sezela 
and Amatikulu supply areas (Vaughan 1991: 8; Vaughan & McIntosh 1993: 443, 447, 453).  
 
Furthermore, small grower production regimes were marked by substantial if somewhat 
varying levels of direct miller intervention.  Cobbet (1984: 8–9) for instance found that at the 
Newspaper site, a condition of loan finance to small-scale growers was control by the mill over 
its use and application, in effect leaving only the task of weeding under the control of applicant 
homesteads. In Nqunquma, concerns over trajectory could be inferred by the fact that many 
sugarcane growing homesteads had fallen into a vicious spiral of decreasing returns, input 
purchases and yields following the repayment of their loan. Similarly, Vaughan observed that in 
the Sezela and Maidstone areas a substantial proportion of cane establishment was undertaken 
by the mill, in which ‘teams of labourers employed by the mill weed and fertilize for growers on 
request’ (Vaughan 1992b: 441), a process replicated in ratoon management. As one Sezela mill 
staff member asserted, ‘We must stop trying to make farmers out of growers who own “postage 
stamps” [insignificant parcels of land]’ (Vaughn 1992a: 13). Rather than inspiring a class of 
independent farmers, as observed by Vaughan, ‘the relationship between grower and company 
may, in these cases, resemble that between lessor and lessee’ (Vaughan 1992b: 428). While 
Vaughan found a difference of attitude at the Felixton and Amatikulu mills, where authorities 
stressed their ‘objective is to develop people not land’, it was admitted that this was contingent 
on an ‘expanded and refined’ extension system, intended ‘to maximise cane supply through very 
close monitoring of the production process’ (Vaughan 1992b: 440).   
 
For Rahman (1997), the differences between these ‘developmental philosophies’ were 
materially conditioned by relative levels of urbanisation in different sites, which influenced the 
availability of non-agricultural employment opportunities, as well as population pressures 
resulting in residential land-leasing or ‘shack-farming’. In ‘more rural’ areas with lower 
population pressure and fewer employment opportunities, miller intervention had less of a 
‘military’ character, with millers performing few physical operations themselves, and marked by 
lower uptake of FAF loans (Rahman 1997: 9).  
 
In many sugarcane growing-areas millers had further purposefully sought to introduce a new 
intermediary class by encouraging the emergence of small black ‘contractors’. Employing a 
discourse of support for ‘entrepreneurs’, miller development companies together with KwaZulu 
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government development institutions adopted a policy of extending loans to selected 
individuals within small grower supply areas for purchasing tractors to provide short-haul cane 
transport and land preparation services. Although such initiatives pre-date the ‘rationalisation’ 
of the cane transport system (i.e. the removal of miller transport subsidies and ‘transport costs’ 
from miller cost claims on the division of proceeds), that they gained stronger emphasis after 
rationalisation is surely not coincidental. In Cobbet’s study, local business elites took up these 
opportunities at Newspaper, creating cartels to control pricing and to some extent reinforcing 
existing wealth differentials, while in Nqunquma a plethora of initial contractors quickly went 
out of business (Cobbett 1984: 13). Vaughan (1992a) provides similar examples of contractors 
facing severe difficulties in sourcing and managing labour, in equipment failure, and general 
disorganisation. While the decision to foster this class of black, intermediary contractors was 
justified as a way of fostering ‘employment’ opportunities, the empirical evidence suggests that, 
at best, small-scale contracting was profitable for a small elite capable of organising themselves 
to prevent competition, thus at the expense of small-holders, and at worst, an economically 
volatile and ultimately unprofitable enterprise (Vaughan 1992a: 7). 
 
Encouraging small-scale sugarcane production thus came about largely as a result of an implicit 
convergence of interest between milling capital and the apartheid state. A burgeoning crisis of 
over-production had resulted from increased capital investment, expanded output and a 
growing reliance on the volatile export market. Although the increase in small-scale production 
was initiated during a brief expansionary phase underpinned by an unprecedented peak in 
export prices, and was motivated in part by the threat to supply posed by the process of land 
acquisition for Bantustan consolidation, the instrumental role of small-growers in helping 
millers to navigate the pressures of the contractionary phase that followed, sustained the early 
growth. As recessionary conditions deepened, small-growers not only provided a source of 
effectively state-subsidised cane to increasingly fewer and more capital-intensive mills, they 
enabled millers to enlarge their share of the total industry surplus. These benefits were 
particularly significant for millers in the course of transport rationalisation (with its anticipated 
reduction in cane supply from outlying areas, and increase in costs claimed by planters from the 
DoP), i.e. in further shifting the cost burden of the rationalisation to the planter capital. 
Meanwhile, in a general context of growing civil unrest, industrial action, and loosening control 
over African mobility, small-scale sugarcane production also presented an opportunity to 
bolster and legitimate the KwaZulu government’s authority by nurturing a conservative class of 
commercial agriculturalists. 
 
Indeed, the expansion of small-scale sugarcane production continued apace through the 1980s 
and early 1990s. The number of registered growers had expanded to over 20 000 by 1989, 
when restrictions on registration were lifted. This would see the further immediate ‘entry’ of 
7 500 ‘illegal’ growers, bringing total number to well over 30 000 (Vaughan & McIntosh 
1993: 447). By the early 1990s, small-scale growers had increased their total share of the 
national area under cane from 1.3% to 20% (Bates & Sokhela 2003: 117). In the democratic era, 
however, the regulatory framework upon which small-holder production was predicated would 
fundamentally shift. 
4. TOWARDS A REGIONAL REGIME: RE-REGULATION AND THE 
BOOM AND BUST OF SMALLHOLDER PRODUCTION 
As I have argued thus far, the origins and initial growth of small-scale grower production was 
intimately linked to their structural relation to fractions of sugar capital within a wider national-
corporatist regime. Rather than emerging organically as a response to a market gap enabled by 
the provision of small-scale credit, or as the outcome of simple, benevolent developmentalist 
policies, the core impetus behind expanding small-scale sugar production derived from a ‘class 
strategy’ by milling capital to contend with the pressures resulting from ‘rationalisation’ and 
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deepening world-market integration, and one which would succeed largely at the expense of 
grower capital. Similarly, the rapid decline of small-scale sugarcane production cannot be 
understood without an appreciation of the substantial, though in some ways obscure, shifts in 
the political economy of South African sugar industry since 1994. Two broad, on-going, and 
interrelated processes are of critical importance. The first is the reform of the industry’s 
regulatory structure, while the second concerns the aggressive northward expansion of South 
African sugar capital. Both processes have fundamentally altered both the structural position of 
small growers and their wider political importance.  
  
Given that intensive government support to agriculture under apartheid generally was clearly 
aimed at sustaining a class of white capitalist farmers, the incoming ANC government was 
strongly influenced by arguments that liberalisation, deregulation and greater competition 
would lower food costs and pave the way for new black entrants into commercial agricultural 
production (Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs 1996; Bernstein 2013: 24.). While the 
Rorich Commission had already endeavoured to introduce more ‘flexibility’ in the sugar 
industry through rationalisation, there was a risk that the new democratic administration 
would extend this neoliberal logic to sugar and completely dismantle the regulatory structure. 
The survival of this structure through the 1990 and early, 2000s, however, is testament to the 
industry’s political foresight and savvy, and its continued statutory powers of self-regulation 
can largely be understood in terms of the inter-locking arguments it made and the strategies 
that it pursued.  
 
The first, and perhaps most basic, argument was that sugar was a ‘special’ case. As sugar 
industries worldwide remained both protected and enjoyed substantial subsidy, de-regulation 
would lead to a ‘dumping’ of subsidised sugar on the domestic market and ensure the collapse 
of the domestic industry. Secondly, while de-regulation might thus ensure a steady supply of 
cheap imported sugar to consumers and downstream manufacturers, this could threaten 
around 85 000 permanent and casual jobs on mills and farms in addition to 350 000 jobs linked 
more indirectly to sugar (Godfrey et al. 2003: 11). Moreover, unlike other sub-sectors, the sugar 
industry could boast the participation of thousands of small-scale black sugarcane farmers as 
well as a growing number of large black farmers benefitting from the industry’s pro-active 
transfer of estate lands and its role in market-based land reform5. The final argument and 
strategy, however, would be the most-subtle: the industry would pre-empt government by 
undertaking its own measures of limited de-regulation; first, by amending the existing Sugar 
Industry Agreement (SIA) in 1994, on the verge of South Africa’s first democratic elections, and 
then subsequently  replacing it with a different agreement in 2000. 
 
The new regulatory dispensation carefully sought to lend an appearance of enhanced ‘flexibility’ 
and greater ‘competition’ whilst preserving the oligopolistic structure of the national-
corporatist regime. While government price control was abolished and sugar now consequently 
priced from the point of sale from individual mills (rather than on a national free-on-rail to 
Durban basis), SASA established a ‘notional’ cane price by which to calculate proceeds for 
division in the DoP, now premised on a fixed proportional division between miller and grower 
sections. However, as cane prices reflected the major variable cost of all mills, any difference in 
sale between the notional price and actual sales was for the account of the miller, thus 
                                                             
5 The transfer of estate lands to medium and large scale black ‘New Freehold Growers’ (NFG) began in 1995 and Inkezo was 
established to facilitate transfer of white commercial farms in 2004. By 2006 358 black sugarcane farmers had benefitted 
from purchasing or transferring 42 397 ha of land — about 10% of land under cane. The industry further argued then that if 
combined with the estimated 74 226 ha under small-scale sugarcane production the total cane land area under black hands 
would amount to 28% — close to government’s land reform target of 30% of white-owned agricultural land. The performance 
of NFGs has been mixed, but on average sustained lower yields in that period (Armitage et al. 2009: 355–7; Kleinbooi 
2009: 197–8). Although not disaggregated in these terms, in SASA’s 2012 industry directory 21% of land under cane is now in 
the hands of NFGs, but to what extent this is a consequence of the transfer of more cane-lands combined with a total 
decrease in the area under cane (from 412 979 ha in 2008 to 378 307 ha in 2012) is unclear (SASA 2012: 5–27). This shift in 
emphasis to supporting large- and medium-scale rather than small-scale farmers paralleled government’s ‘second cycle’ in 
land policy that favoured redistribution for larger, ‘commercially viable’ farming operations (Hall 2010).  
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dissuading price competition (DTI 2003: 4). Secondly, although quantitative measures of control 
were formally abolished, a new system of ‘flexible market shares’ was instituted, in which each 
miller’s proportional share of national production entitled it to a corresponding share of the 
domestic market (based on continual rolling estimates), with the balance being demarcated for 
export. Should a miller over-sell, however, they would be bound to redistribute proceeds in 
excess of their ‘market share’, minus a manufacturing allowance, to ‘under-sellers’. This system 
of ‘flexible market shares’ allowed SASA to retain a measure of quantitative control and 
effectively prevent predatory pricing or other strategies to increase local market share (DTI 
2003: 14).  Critically, sharing the domestic market provides a basis to maintain the system of 
single-channel export market for bulk sugar, effectively spreading exposure to the world market 
proportionate to each mill’s production rather than the destination of its actual sales. The 
domestic tariff, previously based on achieving import parity with the domestic price, was 
meanwhile replaced with a ‘flexible’ tariff derived from the long-term average world price of 
sugar, and adjusted upward to accommodate ‘distortions’ of subsidy in other producer 
countries (DTI 2003: 11). 
 
Despite the more ‘flexible’ features of the new regulatory structure, the sugar industry 
continued to enjoy substantially higher levels of support than other sub-sectors6, and its 
relationship with government remained tense. This was made forcefully clear by the 
Competition Tribunal’s rejection of a planned merger between Tongaat-Huletts and TSB in 
2000, soon after the new Sugar Industry Agreement had been approved. The Tribunal viewed 
the merger as an attempt to ‘pre-empt efforts to intensify competition through progressive 
deregulation’ (Competition Tribunal 2000: 15) and was adamant that the industry continued to 
be characterised by oligopolistic practices of collusion and market segmentation.  
We repeat: the manner in which the equitable proceeds arrangement is 
operated provides no incentive for producers to reduce excess supply. They 
will always be able to sell their excess production on the international 
market at a more or less attractive price; and they will, because of the 
operation of the equitable proceeds arrangement (including single channel 
marketing), always be able to maintain the domestic market price at 
import parity. Hence even when prices are low internationally they will 
have the cushion of the domestic market and when prices increase 
internationally they will earn a windfall. Hence there is no incentive to 
reduce excess supply — on the contrary there is every incentive to expand 
supply ad infinitum while continuing to deny domestic consumers any 
advantage from this expansion in output. Whenever domestic regulators 
question the equitable proceeds arrangement they will be met with the 
same refrain: ‘if we divert our excess supply to the local market it will 
cause a catastrophic drop in price’ — the likelihood is that this excess 
supply will continue to expand thus rendering this argument increasingly 
powerful. But it is a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Competition Tribunal 2000: 20  
 
While the industry grappled with the state’s ambivalence over (or, in the case of the Tribunal, 
hostility to) its regulatory structure, the new democratic dispensation also created new 
opportunities. Although South African-based sugar capital has historically had a presence in 
Southern Africa more broadly, in recent years milling companies have aggressively expanded 
into Southern Africa, bolstered by South Africa’s post-apartheid reintegration into the Southern 
                                                             
6 A 2006 OECD index of Producer Support Estimates (PSE) for different agricultural countries and sub-sectors showed that 
23.2% of the domestic sugar price was effectively subsidised, compared to a national average of 5% for other agricultural 
commodities (OECD 2006: 4). 
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African Development Community (SADC). Often entering via the preferential purchase of ailing 
state companies, this northward expansion has not only enabled millers to take advantage of 
better agro-ecological conditions for cane production, but afforded new opportunities in a 
shifting global economy of sugar production in consumption. Most notable among these are new 
European market-access opportunities available to ‘Least Developed Countries’ (LDCs) under 
the EU’s ‘Everything-But-Arms’ (EBA) resolution7 and rising international prices partially as the 
result of the burgeoning market for ethanol8 (Richardson 2009: 92–115; Richardson 2010: 919; 
Hall 2011: 10; Lincoln 2006: 125). 
  
This regional expansion has heralded a dramatic shift in patterns of production and corporate 
profitability.  Indeed, as can be seen in Table 1 below, the production profile for the two largest 
milling companies, Illovo and Tongaat-Huletts, has shifted dramatically over the past decade: 
whereas in 2002 the South African market accounted for 57% and 70% of Illovo and Tongaat-
Hulett’s production respectively, it now accounts for only 29% and 44% (and a relatively 
marginal proportion of operating profit), with TSB now surpassing both companies’ share of the 
South African market. Aggregate production in South Africa has also declined dramatically, from 
a peak of 2.75 million tons in 2003 to 1.82 million tons in 2012. Moreover, of this amount only 
1.68 million tons was absorbed by the domestic market, 44.9% of which comprised industrial 
sales, leaving only 137 176 tons having to be exported in 2012 compared to the 1.47 million 
tons exported in 2003 (SASA, 2012, p. 26). With the decline attributed largely to drought, cane 
production has declined from 21 million tons from 430 000 ha in 2005 to 16 million tons from 
378 307 ha in 2011 (and 16.8 million tons in 2012). This has been accompanied by a decrease in 
the number of large-scale commercial farmers, from around 2 000 in 2003 to around 1 730 
(including 323 black farmers) in 2012 (Germishuis 2007: 3; Esterhuizen 2012: 4; SASA 
2012: 17, 26).  
 
The new opportunities for regional expansion have enabled milling capital to overcome (or at 
least, dramatically forestall) some of the compounding contradictions of industrial agro-
accumulation within South Africa without undermining its oligopolistic regulatory structure. As 
discussed above, from the 1970s onwards these contradictions manifested most fundamentally 
as a gradually advancing crisis of rising costs, with income from the higher-priced domestic 
market increasingly failing to compensate for greater volumes of sugar destined for a low-
priced world-market. The expansion northwards has brought opportunities for cheaper sugar 
production as well as enhanced marketing opportunities. Furthermore, the northward shift in 
milling capacity has also helped to lower national production in South Africa, and hence help 
ease the ‘saturation’ of the domestic market. 
 
The impact of these seismic shifts in the political economy of sugar production in Southern 
Africa on South Africa’s small-scale growers, has received little attention to date. As argued 
above, growth in small-grower production was largely predicated upon its usefulness to millers 
as one component of their ‘class strategy’ aimed at increasing their relative share of the 
industry’s surplus in a broader context of rationalisation. For different reasons, support for 
small-scale black growers also attracted the political support of the apartheid state. Reform of 
the industry’s regulatory apparatus after the advent of democracy maintained its core functions, 
but its impact on the terms of small-grower incorporation was dramatic, most conspicuously in  
                                                             
7 This has occurred concurrently with the dismantling of Europe’s Common Market Organization (CMO) on sugar, resulting in 
the slashing of formerly protected EU sugar prices, and coming largely at the expense of African-Caribbean-Pacific countries 
which previously enjoyed preferential access to the protected, and hence higher priced, European market under the Lome 
and Contonou conventions. Richardson (2009) has convincingly argued that the EBA acted as a wedge in sacrificing the 
interests of Europe’s domestic sugar producers and ACPs toward concluding new bilateral free trade ‘Economic Partnership 
Agreements’ (Richardson 2009: 92–115). 
8 Indeed, the preferential terms of investment offered by host countries marked a stark contrast to the ambivalence of the 
DTI and the hostility of the Competition Tribunal. Tongaat-Hullets’ 2000 annual report noted that ‘in view of the Tribunal’s 
finding that further expansion in the domestic market is barred to Tongaat-Hulett Sugar, the SADC countries and other 
international arenas will be pursued to provide appropriate avenues for investment’ (Tongaat Hulett Group Ltd 1999: 14). 
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Table: Comparison of regional sugar production and operating profit by Illovo and Tongaat-Huletts in 2002 and 2012 
Country Company Mills 
2002 2012 


















(%) % Rm 
South Africa 
(total)** 
Total  2.403 48.00% 100% -   1.822 7.50% 100    
Illovo  1.110 38.50% 46.5% 57% 42% 314.9 0.441 5.00% 24% 29% 7% 94.43 
THS  0.860 ? 36% 70% ? ? 0.486 ? 26% 44% 26% 354.00 
TSB  0.431 ? 17.9% 100% 100% 55 0.615 ? 34% 100% 100% 352.00 
Swaziland Illovo Umbombo 0.179 0.00% 36% 9% 10% 78 0.224 ? 35% 15% 6% 80.94 
Zimbabwe 







24% ? ? 0.372 ? 100% 34% 45% 621.00 
Malawi Illovo Dwangwa and Nchalo 
0.215 46.50% 100% 11% 20% 153 0.283 42% 100% 19% 39% 526.11 
Zambia Illovo Nakambala 0.199 51.70% 99% 10% 21% 160 0.374  93% 25% 33% 445.17 
Tanzania Illovo Ruembe and Msolwa 
0.072 0.00% 42% 4% - - 0.113 0% 38% 7% 11% 148.39 
Mozambique 
(total) 
Total  0.100 20% 100%    0.344 58% 100%    





0.071 ? 71% 6% ? ? 0.233 ? 67% 21% 29% 402.00 
USA Illovo Monitor Sugar 
0.162 0.00% 36% 8% 7% 50 - - - - - - 
Compiled from: Tongaat-Huletts 2012: 18–20, 65; Tongaat-Huletts 2002: 26; Illovo 2012: 2, 10–11, 28–30; Illovo 2002: 18–23, 39; Remgro 2012: 52; Remgro 2003: 8; Remgro 2004: 19; SASA 
2012/13: 26; Zacarias & Esterhuizen 2013: 5–6; Helm 2003: 4) 
*Excludes Tongaat-Hulett's sugarcane operations in Swaziland. Operating Profit was not reported for TSB, and headline earnings are used here instead. 
** Excludes ‘independent’ Glendale, Umfolozi and UCL company mills. 
*** Hippo Valley was acquired by Tongaat-Huletts in 2006 from its parent company, Anglo American. The bracketed figure represents production of Zimbabwe as a whole, the unbracketed represents 
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the reform of the division of proceeds (DoP) in 1994, just two weeks before South Africa’s first 
democratic elections.  
 
The initiative to reform the DoP was driven largely by the SACGA’s concern over the ‘cost’ basis 
of the division, particularly the extent to which millers’ cost claims were rapidly out-pacing 
growers’. As a consequence of the Rorich Commission’s initiative to rationalise the industry and 
lower its overall cost base, growers now shouldered the full burden of cane transport costs. 
SACGA bemoaned the fact that in their efforts to lower transport costs, growers were ‘giving up 
[whatever savings were being made], and the millers picked them up in terms of the division’ 
(Rahman 1997: 22). SACGA also contended that millers were manipulating costs by postponing 
savings, maintaining uneconomic mills (such as Mt Edgecombe) to increase their cost base, 
enjoying refinery-first charges, and, moreover, were claiming small-grower ‘development’ costs.  
With South Africa on the verge of political transition, both miller and grower sections were 
loathe to invoke yet another government inquiry, and sought to find an ‘in-house’ resolution. 
They made the decision to dismantle the cost basis of the division of proceeds, and agreed to 
apportion proceeds henceforth in terms of a fixed, 64:36 proportional split between grower and 
miller sections respectively. In addition, the two-pool system (see above) was abolished four 
years later, in 1998, effectively removing this further incentive for millers to support small-scale 
growers.  
 
The impact of the new DoP would have immediate reverberations. The mill at Mt Edgecombe 
was closed within a year, and the mill at Eston was relocated. Moreover, mill-based 
‘development’ companies, no longer able to use their costs to claim the mill’s share of total 
industry proceeds, were prompted to: 
[take a] ‘hard look’ at their small growers, their circumstances (especially 
grower debt levels and bad debts) and their importance to the mill 
concerned … the costs of development (establishment), re-planting and 
ratoon management … a procedure to manage withdrawal … [and] 
whether there is local capacity to provide the services formerly provided by 
the development companies … mills may need to subsidise contractors, 
transport costs etc. 
Rahman 1997: 23   
 
With ‘development companies’ facing closure and miller support services to farmers similarly 
set to dwindle, the industry looked for new measures to sustain small-scale production. 
Although the material basis of millers’ support for small-scale production had been removed, 
small growers had retained their political importance to the industry as whole, particularly in 
lending support to its contention to government that drastic deregulation and/or liberalisation 
of sugar would have severe negative impacts on the rural economy and the welfare of poor, 
black South Africans. Despite the reality that small-scale cane growers remained under-
capitalised and constrained by the small size of their land parcels, it was argued that with the 
right arsenal of institutional supports, they could overcome these constraints. Moreover, with 
South Africa on the brink of political transition, particular effort was made to imbue the new 
institutional structures with an overtly ‘democratic’ flavour. 
 
Endeavours to promote the representational inclusivity and the capacity of small-scale growers 
were among the industry’s earliest initiatives in the lead up to 1994, and focused on 
incorporating the KwaZulu Cane Growers Association into SACGA. Small-scale growers were 
now to be directly represented in SACGA and given equal voting powers to their large-scale 
counterparts, despite their much lower proportional contribution to total cane production. The 
Small Grower Development Trust (SGDT) was established in 1992, with an initial R21.6 million, 
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and … develop viable and independent cane growing communities’ (Bates & Sokhela 2003: 116), 
a key focus of the SGDT was on training elected small-scale grower representatives, while 
covering the operational costs of their structures. SACGA also adopted a number of new 
administrative and advisory functions aimed at enhancing small-grower capacity. Notably, there 
has been the deployment of ‘Grower Support Officers’ (GSOs), tasked with institutional and 
technical support for small growers. Their duties include (though in practice often exceed) 
facilitating the functioning of representative organisations, coordinating cane-supply logistics in 
communal areas, and conducting training in cane husbandry (Armitage et al. 2009: 359).  
 
Technical and financial support mechanisms for small-holders were also reconfigured. One early 
effort was a new ‘partnership’ or ‘joint-venture’ launched between the South African Sugar 
Research Institute (SASRI) and the provincial Department of Agriculture and Environment 
Affairs (DAEA) in 1996 to replace the extension support previously provided by millers and the 
KwaZulu government (Eweg 2009: 7). A second notable change was FAF’s 2001 re-launch as 
Umthombo Agricultural Finance (UAF). While remaining committed to extending small-scale 
credit, Umthombo was no longer able to rely on mill staff to administer and oversee the 
application for loans, and therefore sought to maximise the efficiency of their modest staff 
complement by adopting a more stringent screening process (Bates & Sokhela 2003: 113).  
This new complex of institutional support mechanisms was the result of a subtle but crucial 
structural shift. Previously integrated into the industry as veiled extensions of milling capital 
under tight management regimes involving direct interventions in production and logistics, 
small growers were now reconstituted as small but ‘independent’ capitals, ‘democratically’ 
incorporated within SACGA. Yet in their intimate pairing, the simultaneous processes of 
rationalisation and democratisation masked a net decrease in material support to small-scale 
growers, who despite their inclusion in representative structures, remained vertically subsumed 
in monopsonic relation with miller processors. In other words, insofar that growers’ remained 
embroiled in close and less advantageous relations of exchange with millers, their realignment 
as a small ‘independent’ fraction of planting capital disguised their accentuated marginality in 
the wider social division of a still highly technically and economically integrated process of sugar 
production. 
 
Nonetheless, high levels of growth in both small-scale grower numbers and production in the 
1990s appeared to vindicate the new regime and give credence to the industry’s claims to be 
promoting ‘development’, particularly in the ‘more rural’ areas of Sezela and Umfolozi9. By 1999 
the numbers of small-scale growers had swelled to around 50 000, and their share of national 
production doubled from 7% in 1992 to 14% in 2002 (Bates & Sokhela 2003: 107). For perhaps 
the first time in the industry’s history, small growers indeed appeared to be emerging as 
‘developing’ independent growers, and by 2003 SSGs were no longer officially registered as mill 
‘employees’ (Godfrey et al. 2003: 11).  
 
By the early 2000s, however, the new regime had already begun to show signs of what, in 
hindsight, can be identified as unsustainable tendencies. One disquieting pattern was the 
marked unevenness in small-scale production. By 1997 only around 8 000 small growers were 
estimated to survive solely off income from cane-production, and by 2003 (Sokhela and Bates 
                                                             
9 Indeed, anticipation of changes to cane supply following the removal of mill-site rights and reform of the division of 
proceeds would certainly seem to have been the motivation behind CG Smith’s sale of its Glendale mill and the purchase of 
the more rural Umfolozi mill, and Tongaat-Hulett’s attempt to purchase the ailing Ntumeni mill, both in 1992. Illovo 
(formerly CG Smith) sold both the Glendale and Umfolozi mills in a BEE transfer to the Sokhela family in 2004 and 2005, 
while the Umfolozi mill was subsequently purchased by a consortium of white cane growers in 2009. Ultimately Tongaat-
Huletts did not purchase the Ntumeni mill, which subsequently closed down after filing for bankruptcy. However, Ntumeni 
had become largely dependent on its small grower supply base as a result of Tongaat-Huletts’ refusal to surrender any mill-
site rights to some white-commercial farmers situated close to Ntumeni, but nonetheless compelled to supply the more 
distant Amatikulu mill. What was left of Ntumeni’s supply base was effectively absorbed into Amatikulu, which appeared to 
have suited Tongaat-Hulett. Indeed, according to Minaar (1992) there were ‘accusations that SASA was colluding with 
Tongaat Huletts to block the scrapping of the registered quota land (RQL) regulation which ties cane production to specific 
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2003: 109) estimated that more than 50% of total production originated from only about 20% of 
growers.  With estimates of the minimum economic land size for South African dryland cane 
production of around 10 ha (Mbowa & Nieuwoudt 1998: 405), low incomes were obviously in 
part the result of the small size of land-holdings within the former Bantustans (and also their 
highly unequal distribution), as well as constraints to growth in farm size. This is evident in the 
partially observable (but systemically untraceable) tendency for under-resourced growers to 
enter into leasehold arrangements with other, better-resourced growers seeking to exceed their 
customary allocations (Munro 1996: 11). 
 
A second factor was weakening support and oversight capacity. The SASRI-DAEA partnership 
was not able to provide the personnel and degree of organisational oversight previously 
available through milling company teams comprising section managers, field officers and 
extension officers. Although the SGDT would train more than 20 000 small growers by 2007, it 
could not attain financial self-sufficiency; by 2002 small-scale sugarcane growers contributed 
only R2 million of the R27.2 million in costs incurred by the Trust (Bates & Sokhela 2003: 113; 
Armitage et al 2009: 359).  
 
Of particular concern to Umthombo, however was the growing tendency for growers to engage 
in fraud, whereby after receiving a loan a grower would submit their cane under a neighbour’s 
production code and enjoy the full returns from the crop without amortising their debt with the 
fund (Bates & Sokhela 2003: 114). Despite a low default rate in the early 2000s, without the 
direct oversight of production by millers, and the industry and state subsidies that supported it, 
FAF/UAF was suddenly exposed to the economic vulnerability and the opportunism of its 
targeted beneficiaries. The growing prevalence of fraud and default eventually compelled 
Umthombo to close its credit facilities and write off millions of rands in unrecovered loans.  
 
By the time drought had begun to afflict KwaZulu-Natal in the mid-2000s, small growers found 
themselves subject to a generalised (though uneven) cost-price squeeze. In response, the SASRI-
DAEA partnership successfully distributed over R60 million worth of ‘free’ fertilizer in eight 
weeks, with SACGA also ensuring some effective redistribution of proceeds through a flat rebate 
for VAT and diesel fuel. In addition, Supplementary Payment Fund (SPF) transfers (of which 
64% was effectively contributed by large-scale growers and 36% by the milling companies) 
more than quadrupled growers’ net operating income from R367 to R1 654 per ha, although 
with only few hectares at their disposal, the effective returns to small-scale growers were 
limited (Armitage et al 2009: 363)10. Moreover, although Umthombo’s financial services have 
since been restricted largely to a savings/retention service11, government’s Micro Agriculture 
Finance Institute of South Africa (MAFISA) has recently earmarked about R50 million for 
sugarcane, of which about R7 million has been disbursed  (DAFF 2012). SACGA has continued to 
seek novel institutional responses to address the constraints faced by small-scale growers, and 
to date these have largely revolved around promoting co-operatives and assisting with 
incremental re-planting schemes (Munsamy 2012). While these interventions have no-doubt 
helped to arrest the rate of decline of small-scale production, however, they have also failed to 
reverse it.  
 
The massive growth of small-scale sugarcane production in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
characterised in part by the prevalence of leasing agreements between producers and 
fraudulent credit practices, was thus something of a ‘bubble’, ultimately ‘popped’ by the harsh 
circumstances of the drought which gripped KwaZulu-Natal in the mid-2000s. Attempts to 
                                                             
10 To provide some sense of context, the National Planning Commission provides a rough poverty line reference of R524 per 
capita, per month (NPC, 2013). While providing an important source of additional income, sugarcane production in South 
Africa is hence generally insufficient to push individuals or homesteads with the average size of landholdings (1–4 ha each) 
out of poverty.   
11 When a grower submits their cane, a section of growers proceeds can be withheld as ‘savings’ for later re-investment in 
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institute more open and ‘democratic’ institutions to represent small-scale growers, while 
laudable in themselves, were not a substitute for the material and structural underpinnings of 
small-scale production provided by the previous regulatory dispensation, ‘patrimonial’ as it was.  
 
The shifting terms of small-scale growers’ incorporation into the South African sugar industry is 
critical to understanding their rise and decline. Equally important, however, is the role of the 
regulatory structure of the sugar industry as an instrument for mediating its deeper 
contradictions, at once social, economic, and political. The nature of these has also shifted over 
time. In the first instance, while reform of the DoP undermined the material interest of millers in 
supporting small-scale production at the expense of large-scale planters, millers’ aggressive 
expansion into Southern Africa has effectively ameliorated the chronic crises of domestic over-
production, relative instability of cane supply and low-world price dependence which 
characterised the national-corporatist regime for many decades. Secondly, a pointed industry 
strategy to pre-empt land reform through the facilitation of transfers of estate lands and white 
farms to medium and large-scale black growers has reduced the singular political importance of 
small-scale growers as black agriculturalists dependant on the industry for their support and 
survival.   
 
These shifts are perhaps most evident in waning industry interest in preserving its national-
corporatist character. The review of the Sugar Act poised for completion in 2015 is likely to 
decentralise industry-wide governance to ‘vertical slices’ comprising particular mills, their 
supplier growers, and downstream processing (SACGA 2013: 7). In the absence of more 
information, the implications for cane-pricing and the division of proceeds remain unclear, but 
dismantling the milling-grower division would certainly preclude any return to the kind of 
surplus-shifting regulatory measures which characterised small growers’ original terms of 
incorporation, and is likely to accentuate the bargaining power of monopsonistic millers in 
relation to their supplier-growers. While the recent increase in Brazilian sugar imports would 
suggest that the sugar tariff will probably remain in place or even rise, at least in the short term, 
the recent passing of mandatory biofuel blending schedules for ethanol indicate that biofuel 
production is set to emerge as a potential alternative mechanism for ‘surplus removal’ to exports 
(Wenberg 2013; Mail & Guardian 2013; Sugar Online 2012).  In tandem with the growing 
proportion of total sugar consumption accounted for by manufactures, this combination of 
reforms appears set to encourage heightened levels of industrial integration in South Africa’s 
sugar market, a reduction of the surplus-product sold in the low-priced world market, and an 
effective ‘shake-out’ of less efficient and less capitalised growers and mills. In the context of the 
increasingly regional and corporate character of sugar production, South Africa would seem to 
be set to be ‘carved-out’ as a specialised enclave of domestic production and consumption, in 
contrast to but complemented by, production for preferential export markets located in the 
region.  
5. CONCLUSION  
My analysis of the rise and fall of small-scale sugar cane production is somewhat provocative. 
Perhaps most challenging is its opposition to many conventional perspectives on what 
fundamentally constrains the livelihoods of the landed poor of South Africa and how to improve 
their welfare. Many such perspectives resemble the position articulated by the Native Affairs 
Department (NAD) more than 60 years ago (see section 3 above). Although the NAD’s vision of 
‘self-sufficiency’ has undergone something of a semantic recoding into the currently fashionable 
notion of ‘sustainable livelihoods’, the goal of nurturing the economic autonomy of the poor 
remains central to both mainstream and ‘radical’ positions. Often the constraints on such 
autonomy are understood in terms of either ‘market failures’ or ‘market distortions’, or 
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in many other countries, the most influential vision at present is one premised on promoting 
market competition via liberalisation and deregulation. 
 
Yet it is small-scale cane growers’ very decoupling from large-scale milling capital that today 
underlies their relative poverty. A key factor is the massive downscaling of production and 
logistical support services previously performed by millers for small growers as a group. 
Reconstituted as ‘independent’ capitals, growers now compete directly with a highly-capitalised 
large-scale grower segment. Their ‘independence’ is analogous to that of hypothetical garment 
piece-workers ‘freed’ from producing 100 shirts an hour using company machinery, and now 
sewing 10 shirts an hour using their own sewing machine and paying for their own raw 
materials.  
 
Even if those garment workers enjoyed greater representational rights, subsidisation of thread 
by the company, and access to small-scale credit services, these would be a paltry substitute for 
the objective decline of their productive conditions and the reduced income they received as a 
result. Such is the nature of the shift of small-scale growers from being ‘propertied proletarians’, 
or effective ‘lessees’ of land, to ‘autonomous’ petty-commodity producers. It is autonomy to 
attempt to survive by any means possible, or to wither away, in the face of the generalised and 
unrelenting drive to increase the scale of production and improve productivity that underpins 
competition in a capitalist economy, or what a large-scale commercial farmer recently referred 
to as ‘Natural, Simply Capitalism’ (cited in Bernstein 2013). 
 
But while these ‘natural’ forces may have a general character, the contradictory forms in which 
they are constituted, and which mediate them to a degree, are always highly uneven and 
contingent. In the historical account of the sugar industry presented here, it is clear that its 
regulatory structure has played a critically important role in ensuring the survival of both large 
planters and small growers in different periods. With the backing of the state, a core function of 
the regulatory structure was to provide a means to codify preferential terms of exchange on the 
domestic market. In contrast to conventional developmental approaches that seek to adapt 
targeted beneficiaries to the rigours of the market, here the market was adapted to the 
structural limitations of particular producers. 
 
The analysis in this paper, however, also exposes the considerable tensions and contradictions 
inherent in the national-corporatist sugar regime. Perhaps the most obvious and enduring 
constraint to intra-industry surplus redistribution is the overall limit of the value of the surplus. 
Secondly, whatever its internal distribution mechanisms and their outcomes, a core tension 
arises when the interests of one particular industry is buttressed at the expense of others. How 
can one evaluate an industry’s broader contribution to employment and trade against the 
relative benefits of efficient (that is, cheap) production of commodities, both as direct wage 
goods and/or raw material to downstream manufacturers? Thirdly, the values prevailing on the 
world sugar market act as a final limit, even when tariff protection from other producers is 
considered politically feasible. Indeed, as we have seen, the mercantilism (i.e. manipulation of 
the terms of trade) of South Africa’s sugar regime in the past was viable only in the context of an 
expanding domestic market.  
 
These fundamental tensions reflect, of course, the highly contradictory dynamics of capitalism 
more broadly. Encouraging petty commodity production is not necessarily the most ‘socially 
optimal’ option in many contexts. But it is the question of having the option that concerns us 
here. 
 
The regionalisation of sugar capital seems to have resolved the problem of ‘over-production’ 
from the perspective of ensuring corporate profitability, but as an issue of national 
development, the contradictory politics of regulation remain highly relevant. The current 
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sugar capital are concerned. The emerging dispensation appears set to effectively address the 
issue of ‘surplus-removal’, comprising as it does both ‘demand-side’ statutory measures that 
support a bio-fuels market, and ‘supply-side’ regulatory reforms which threaten to ‘shake-out’ 
less capitalised growers by restructuring the industry on a decentralised (but vertically and 
industrially-integrated) basis. From the perspective of the state, this may well go some way to 
preserving existing levels of employment in sugar milling operations while achieving the price 
benefits of liberalisation in the long-term, even if this is at the expense of sugar consumers in the 
short-term.  
 
But such a path carries the foreboding corollary of entrenching the highly concentrated and 
capital-intensive character of a key component of South Africa’s agro-industrial economy. 
Perhaps most disturbingly, the review of the Sugar Act threatens to cement (or even further 
catalyse) the generalised decline of small-scale sugarcane production, permanently eliminating 
the legislative basis of the systemic mechanisms which underpinned their historical growth, and 
further narrowing the range of economic opportunities available to the landed poor in South 
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